Complex regulatory decisions about risk rely on the brokering of evidence between providers and recipients, and involve personality and power relationships that influence the confidence that recipients may place in the sufficiency of evidence and, therefore, the decision outcome. We explore these relationships in an agent-based model; drawing on concepts from environmental risk science, decision psychology and computer simulation. A two-agent model that accounts for the sufficiency of evidence is applied to decisions about salt intake, animal carcass disposal and radioactive waste. A dynamic version of the model assigned personality traits to agents, to explore their receptivity to evidence. Agents with Science of The Total Environment, Volumes 466-467, 1 January 2014, Pages 74-83 2 'aggressor' personality sets were most able to imbue fellow agents with enhanced receptivity (with 'avoider' personality sets less so) and clear confidence in the sufficiency of evidence.
Introduction
Complex regulatory decisions on risk rely on the provision, scrutiny and acceptance of scientific evidence. Davies et al. (2010) explain how evidence is brokered (received, processed and passed on) between actors -a regulatee and regulator for example -in order to assess the significance of risks and inform decisions on how they should be managed (Oxera, 2000) . As evidence is exchanged between organisations and promoted through a decision hierarchy towards the ultimate decision maker, intermediate recipients judge the sufficiency of evidence for those aspects of the decision they are accountable for. Only when deemed sufficient is evidence passed on to others for a similar interrogation. In regulatory settings, the recipients of evidence may also hold and exercise power over the provider with respect to its sufficiency. As a contribution to the smarter regulation debate (Better Regulation Commission, 2006; Gouldson et al., 2009; Hutter, 2005; Taylor et al., 2012; we are interested in how regulatory confidence in risk-informed decisions is instilled as evidence is brokered between parties. We suggest that agent-based tools may help researchers explore relationships between evidence, personality and power . Here, we describe a research tool for this purpose and test its applicability in the complex environment of regulatory decision-making using three case studies.
Agent-based modelling simulates the relationships between actors participating in complex decisions (Courdier et al., 2002; Chaturvedi et al., 2000; Kurahashi and Terano, 2005) . It has been used in the environmental sciences to explore negotiations on groundwater management (Feuillette at al., 2003) , the effectiveness of greenbelt allocation in periurban settings (Brown et al., 2004) , forest management strategies (Nute et al., 2004) and pine beetle infestation (Perez and Dragicevic, 2010) . By combining knowledge about choice, so-called 'automated decision makers' can partially represent human interactions by accounting for the behaviours and makeup of actors. Using these tools, scholars have modelled the influence of personality (a factor of individual difference; Alavizadeh et al., 2008; Canuto et al., 2005;  Ghasem-Aghaee and Ören, 2007; Nassiri- Mofakham et al., 2008 Mofakham et al., , 2009 ) and power (a factor of the interactions between individuals; Cincotti and Guerci et al., 2005; Marreiros et al., 2008; Prada and Paiva, 2009 ) on decision making.
Applications that explore how agents broker scientific evidence between one another are limited (Chen et al., 2011; Berger et al., 2010) . Scholars have, however, simulated the effectiveness of trading agents (Haddawy et al., 2004) , investigating the effectiveness of auctions (Bohte et al., 2001; Mizuta and Steiglitz, 2000; Mizuta and Yamagata, 2001) , buyer coalition schemes (Yamamoto and Sycara, 2001 ) and trade brokering (Alkemade et al., 2003) . Agents mimic brokering by representing an exchange of information between parties to a decision. In models of financial trade, analogous here to the exchange of evidence, agents are the buyers and sellers of a commodity. Successful trades demonstrate small fluctuations over time. In regulatory decision-making, a recipient of evidence (usually the regulator) who gives positive feedback to the provider of evidence (the regulatee, operator) might increase the provider's understanding of what is expected of a regulatory submission 4 (e.g. an environmental safety case). This may mean fewer fluctuations in the recipient's view about the sufficiency of the evidence submitted, with a possibility for smoother regulatory approvals as an outcome for both parties -a successful 'trade' of evidence and increased confidence on behalf of the recipient. Conceptualising the role of receptivity about knowledge is not new. Both knowledge creation and transfer are dependent on transparency and receptivity (Larsson et al., 1998) , some claiming these as key to building trust (McCole, 2002) , to effective communication (Tsali et al., 2008) and as determinants of inter-partner learning (Hamel, 1991) . In short, establishing interpersonal relations through receptivity and transparency encourages the free flow of information (Tsai et al., 2008) .
Bringing the features of real-world regulatory decisions on risk, personality and power together within an agent-based model is challenging and we are cautious about claims to reproduce the complexities of multi-agent decisions. Arthur (1998) comments on the reality of economics via-à-vis our attempts to model the flows and interactions between agents: Modestly, we are concerned with whether relationships between evidence, people (personality) and power (structures) can be represented in an agent-based model to examine regulatory decisions: (i) can we construct such a model?; (ii) can it represent power structures and information flows?; (iii) can we represent the influence of personality traits and decision context on decision outcome? We explore these questions in a two-agent model incorporating the prior art on power (French and Raven, 1959) and personality (Costa and McCrae, 1992) alongside expert knowledge captured from case study interviews.
Methods and model development
A proof of concept model was designed by reference to three case studies from Davies et al. (2010) . The flow of evidence between parties to these decisions (regulatees, their professional advisors, regulators and their advisors, the final decision-maker) was mapped according to Oxera (2000) . A two-agent model was then designed to represent the receptivity of recipients (the regulator) to the evidence submitted by a provider (the regulatee, or operator). Having tested its functionality, a dynamic version of the model was attempted, accounting for receptivity between parties and, by inference, the degree of recipient confidence in the evidence brokered to inform risk decisions.
Scoping study -characterising the brokering of evidence
Prior to model design, open-ended interviews (n=5) were conducted with regulators to obtain generalised insights on the brokering of evidence in regulatory decision-making. The researcher (GJD) assured confidentiality before recording interviews, asking respondents to explain their expert role and the brokering process. Interviews revealed the real-life complexities that characterise the flow of information within decisions, which are not 6 represented in decision diagrams or risk frameworks. Field notes and interviews were transcribed and used to support development of lengthier semi-structured interviews and the agent-based model described below.
Case study selection and decision routes
The research utilised three of six candidate case studies. These three were chosen because they reflected a range of conditions for the brokering of evidence (Table 1) and provided access to willing participants: (1) the regulatory review of a post-closure safety case for low-level nuclear waste disposal (denoted NW; an environmental permitting decision);
(2) the disposal of avian influenza infected animal carcasses (AI; a planning decision under emergency conditions) and (3) the proposal to reduce levels of dietary salt intake (SI; a policy development decision).
Evidence in the NW case study passes through a well-defined decision framework and embodies high levels of scientific uncertainty, given the need to examine radioactive releases to the biosphere over geological time. In contrast, the SI case study involved relatively undisputed evidence about harm, but uncertainty around the optimal policy intervention required to manage risk. The AI case study was concerned with an emergency response where the evidence being brokered was for emergency planning purposes in anticipation of relatively 'novel' risks. For each case study, peer reviewed and grey literature was used to inform the directional flow of evidence and individual decision accountabilities. The decision route for each case study was drafted using the structures in Oxera (2000) , mapping the flow of evidence and noting the role played by various actors. 
In-depth interviews
Semi-structured interviews (n=3) were then conducted with experts for each case study to validate the decision routes above. Experts' feedback improved early drafts and validated the formal exchange of evidence between provider and recipient agents (Figure 1 ). During the exploratory interviews, it became clear the sufficiency of evidence was, in part, determined by how it was characterised by six factors. Accordingly, the experts were asked to break decisions down into constituent phases on a timeline, and rate the extent to which the evidence could be characterised as being qualitative, quantitative, political, social, technical and costly. Information was used to construct the subsequent two-agent model. 
Representing lines of evidence
The evidence used to test a hypothesis about the significance of a risk and how it should be managed is rarely uniform in direction, strength or weight (see Linkov et al., 2009) .
Evidence is frequently nested, in that evidence supporting a high-level 'parent' hypothesis is often contingent on lower level 'child' hypotheses with their associated lines of evidence. To represent this structure, we employed the TESLA™ software (http://www.quintessaonline.com/TESLA/; Benbow et al., 2006; Quintessa, 2008) . TESLA adopts evidence support logic and interval probability theory to represent how lines of evidence inform a group decision; say, on the risks of radioactive release from a waste repository over time ( Figure 2 ). TESLA disaggregates a decision into a hierarchy of parent and child hypotheses, for which an expert group -reflecting on how sufficient and necessary a child hypothesis is for answering a corresponding parent -determines the influence the available evidence has.
In this way, 'degrees of belief' that support (+) or refute (-) a parent hypothesis are constructed, with uncommitted belief also being captured (Figure 2 ), the sum of these weights equating to 1 (100% belief).
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Figure 2. TESLA representation of parent and child hypotheses for radioactive waste disposal (adapted from Quintessa, 2008) .
Adapting TESLA, we assumed each hypothesis has an agent -a recipient with responsibility for interrogating the evidence submitted to them. Regulatory staff in different positions of authority have variable degrees of power to determine the sufficiency and adequacy of evidence submitted in support of a belief -say about the operational safety of an industrial facility.
A deterministic two-agent model incorporating receptivity
A two-agent model to simulate the understanding above was developed using North and Macal (2007) . Receptivity facilitates knowledge sharing (Deng, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; 2009 ) and the opposite of receptivity is resistance (Kearney, 2007) . Agent receptivity was represented through the assignment of weights (see Appendix for conditional logic) for personality and power influences , and for the receipt, processing and passing-on of evidence, with an overall receptivity weight derived. An interface allowed the user to vary the conditions for the recipient's receptivity for a set of scenarios (see Supplementary Information Table A1 and Figure A1 ). Spread sheet layers, represented in Figure 3 , drew on values set through the interface and performed 10 000 runs for recipients' receptivity under selected scenarios. The mean receptivity (with standard deviation) was estimated using three steps:
1. Intensity ranges were assigned to factors (personality and power, and the level of decision uncertainty) that influenced recipient receptivity.
2. The model selected values at random within these ranges using the random number generator within MS Excel®.
3. Values (0-1) were propagated through the receptivity model to generate a weight for the receipt, processing and passing-on stages, before being averaged to generate an overall recipient receptivity.
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
Figure 3. Logical flow of the deterministic two-agent model.
Levels of intensity were selected for agents' personality traits. The 'big five' traits (openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness and neuroticism), said to represent the most stable characteristics of individuals over time were employed, with 'neuroticism' replaced by 'emotional stability' (the reverse of 'neuroticism') allowing a scoring of traits uniform in direction (Johnson, 1999; Costa and McCrae, 1992) . Scholars scoring personality traits do so on a scale from 0 to 100, agreeing that scores 55 or higher are considered to exhibit a strong dimension in that trait. Those that score 45 or below are considered to exhibit the opposite effect. Trait scores between 45 and 55 fall within the standard deviation of the big five personality test (Barrick et al., 1998; Digman, 1990; Ghasem-Aghee and Ören, 2007; Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999) . Trait scores were assigned for recipient and provider, representing agent's motivation to process information systematically and to share this knowledge Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999) . Here, the conventional degrees of intensity (low, medium and high) were refined to six levels to investigate the influence of decision uncertainty (Table 2a,b) . This allowed the user to better represent the case studies by low to high levels of decision uncertainty. Table 2 (a,b) Levels of intensity characterising (a) decision uncertainty; and (b) personality trait, where "Random" refers to the option to select values using a random number generator.
(a) Levels of intensity used to characterise decision uncertainty. 
A dynamic two-agent model incorporating personality and power
Finally, we attempted a dynamic version of the model to incorporate a two-way interaction (dialogue) between provider and recipient and explore the confidence that might be instilled in recipients about the adequacy of evidence submitted to them. In interviews, experts explained how recipients and providers negotiate and reach consensus about the adequacy of evidence. We were interested whether the model could represent this process.
Agent receptivity in the dynamic model was represented using the logic set out in the deterministic model, although three rather than six levels of intensity were used. Legitimate power and referent power were also incorporated. Legitimate power reflects the limited period recipients are permitted to engage with providers. The model assumed a consultation consisted of one submission of evidence per day. The number of days' consultation was set by the value of the recipient's legitimate power, which decreased by a value of '1' with each simulation run. Referent power was reflected by including this within agent's assessment of receptivity. An agent's referent power was assessed by taking the average of the agent's agreeableness and emotional stability.
Using suitable combinations of the 'big five' personality traits above, agents were assigned one of four personalities ('negotiator', 'aggressor', 'submissive' and 'avoider'; Nassiri-Mofakham et al., 2008; 2009; Santos et al., 2010) . To achieve this, each of the big five personality traits, for each agent, was assigned a low, medium or high value (0 -0.45, 0.45 -0.55 and 0.55 -1 respectively). Because the literature does not specify for certain the intensity for the four personality sets, a level of intensity was selected from a uniform distribution and maintained within this band for subsequent simulations, as illustrated in Table 3 for the "Agent environment" spread sheet. Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) code was used to update an "Agent environment" spread sheet according to changes in the agents' personal information in the model ( Figure 4 ) and contextual issues derived from a "Scenario" spread sheet; before receptivity was estimated and stored in a "Data log" spread sheet. For every run, a new random value was generated within the same band for each personality trait. Updating the recipient's and provider's personal information (Figure 4 ) reflected the variance in the expression of personality across different decision contexts (Costa and McCrae, 1992) .
Overall receptivity was estimated using an average of receptivity across each of the three stages -the receiving, processing and passing-on stage of evidence brokering.
[FIGURE 4 HERE] Table A2 ). An iteration of evidence between recipient and provider was allowed to continue until a 'Do While/Loop' function in VBA determined the number of simulations were complete (representing the extent of the recipient's legitimate power).
Results
We present three sets of results: (i) recipient agents' receptivity as represented in the deterministic model; (ii) how agent personality differs in its predisposition toward 'propensity to trust', 'trustworthiness', 'motivation to process evidence' and 'motivation to share knowledge' which are used to represent agent receptivity; (iii) demonstrating how recipient and provider agents with greatest and least capacity to build receptivity also express greatest and least capacity to build confidence. The error bars represent standard deviation and show the difference between the mean receptivity when values for each parameter were selected at random between 0 and 1 (the control) and the mean receptivity in the situation where both the recipient and the provider was predisposed toward imbuing the recipient with receptivity (the second bar in each cluster). In all clusters, the recipient is seen to have the greatest impact on recipient receptivity, by comparing the third and fourth bar in each cluster. Also, the influence agents have on recipient receptivity increases with the presence of decision uncertainty, reflecting the impact of agent's motivation to process and share knowledge.
Recipient receptivity to evidence submitted

The dynamic model -the role of personality
Four personality sets were investigated; the 'negotiator', 'aggressor', 'submissive'
and 'avoider'. These gave a broad indication of the model's capacity to simulate agent receptivity. The 'avoider' personality was split into avoider-low and avoider-high referring to high and low measures of agreeableness respectively, testing the model's capability to represent an agents' propensity to trust and trustworthiness. Figure 7a -c illustrates that the avoider-low personality, with a low measure of agreeableness, produced the least propensity to trust and trustworthiness.
[INSERT FIGURE 7(a-c)]
Figure 7. Showing relative measures of (a) propensity to trust, (b) trustworthiness and (c) referent power for each of the four personalities in the two agent model. Where 'avoiderhigh' and 'avoider-low' personality is being calculated with high and low measures of agreeableness and emotional stability respectively. Figure 8 illustrates the frequency of weights being generated over 10,000 runs under the best and worst circumstances for agents motivated to process and share knowledge.
Agents' motivation to process knowledge was dependent on their orientation toward uncertainty (Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999) . Agents with high levels of openness are uncertainty-motivated. Agents low in openness were said to be certainty-orientated. This meant that when uncertainty and openness were either both high or both low, they were motivated to process knowledge. An agent's motivation to share knowledge, however, was dependent on how motivated agents were to process the evidence. If either agent was highly motivated to process the evidence (or both were unmotivated), this resulted in agents being poorly motivated to share knowledge. If agents were unequally motivated to process the evidence they were more motivated to share knowledge (Cheng, unpublished) . These results reflect the literature on the propensity to trust, trustworthiness and referent power. Table 4 shows that the aggressor and the avoider-low personality generated greatest and least propensity to trust, trustworthiness and referent power respectively, Figure 9 shows the different rates at which confidence was gained as recipients and providers engaged in dialogue under the best (top schematics; a) and worst (bottom schematics; b) case scenarios. At the onset of dialogue, the level of recipient's confidence varies, just as the rate at which confidence is attained varied for each submission. Even with this element of uncertainty, the model is able to distinguish between the best and worst case scenario over 10 submissions of evidence (where the recipient must gain 100% confidence in the adequacy of supporting evidence before fully accepting the sufficiency of the providers belief, and where recipients have unlimited legitimate power). The distinction between agents with personalities predisposed to being receptive and imbuing others with receptivity (and those that are not) is seen to affect the rate of the confidence building by: the rate at which the recipient's confidence builds over time, resulting in 10 submissions being completed in 71 rather than 96 days (i.e. 26% more efficient). 
[INSERT FIGURE 8]
Propensity to trust 'Most' √ √ 'Least' √ Trustworthiness 'Most' √ 'Least' √ Referent power 'Most' √ √ √ 'Least' √
Discussion
The nature of regulation is under review as western Governments move towards a more facilitative, decentralised approach (Gunningham, 2009; Pollard et al., 2009 ). This raises issues about the tone of regulatory exchange, the quality of evidence that supports environmental risk decisions and the skill sets required of regulatory staff. For the regulated, the same applies -those seeking earned recognition by going beyond compliance (Taylor et al., 2012; Classically, agent-based models focus on how complex dynamics and outcomes rely on the network of interactions between agents. They have been built using techniques such as discrete event simulation and object orientated programming (Brailsford and Schnidt, 2003) that reproduce the critical features of complex systems using component level rules.
'Behavioural signatures' can be allocated to individual agents (Epstein, 2006; North and Macal, 2007) offering a social richness and behavioural realism (Mischel, 1999; Mischel and Shoda,, 1995; Shoda, 1999; 2002) difficult to capture in conventional decision analytics. Our two-agent model is rudimentary, but suggests how transactions between parties might influence a recipient's receptivity towards the evidence that subsequently informs a decision on risk. The two-agent model is shown capable, at least in principle, of exploring a recipient's tendency to trust, and the influence this has on their receptivity and the rate at which confidence can be gained.
To demonstrate the breadth of behaviour captured within the deterministic model, the most optimistic and pessimistic scenarios were simulated by making changes in system parameters; revealing the influence underlying features had on agent receptivity. As a form of validation, this was carried out for a number of scenarios, illustrating how the model reflects aspects of environmental permitting (NW), policy development (SI) and emergency planning decisions (AI). Recipient receptivity was highest for the former, which was expected given the greater level of uncertainty. Agents with high openness to experience providing evidence (characterised by high uncertainty) to agents with low openness to experience had high and low motivation to process information, respectively, and were highly motivated to share knowledge (Cheng, unpublished; Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999; Sorrentino et al., 1992) . It is also seen that recipient receptivity had a greater influence than provider receptivity (Figure 6 ), suggesting the hierarchical model of receptivity is able to represent some of the trends explained to us by experts.
Model dynamics were developed by assigning agents specific personalities and drawing parallels between the brokering of evidence and of commodities on a financial market. Agents wishing to exchange a commodity (here, confidence) must determine whether bids for the commodity are acceptable (i.e. whether provider and recipient expectations about the weight of evidence relevant to the decision are matched). Eventually, when the buyer (provider) makes an acceptable bid (a submission of adequately weighted evidence), the seller (recipient) exchanges the commodity for a specified currency (here, 20 confidence translating into units of sufficiency about the evidence submitted to them).
Accounting for the provider's receptivity is an important extension of the deterministic two agent model. Experts in the interviews explained how inexperienced regulatees (providers) may miss opportunities, during regulatory exchange, to instil recipient regulators with confidence by failing to communicate the weight of evidence supporting a risk decisioninstead, evidence was presented in binary terms. Our model interpreted the provider's receptivity as the extent to which the agent would 'grasp what was being asked of them' through the regulatory exchange ( Figure 9 ). Similarly, Gratch et al (2009) shows how recipients engaging in intelligible conversation have a better chance of imparting knowledge.
This understanding of recipient and provider receptivity was employed in our model to determine the likelihood that (1) recipients would openly divulge how they wanted the evidence to be weighted; and (2) that the provider would comprehend this.
By giving agents sets of personality characteristics we showed that overall, the aggressor and the avoider personality had the greatest and least potential to influence agent receptivity. The 'avoider' personality set built confidence at a slower rate than the 'aggressor'; the latter suggesting the recipient personality set was less open to divulging what types of evidence they require, and for the provider suggesting a personality set less attentive to what was being asked of them. The pessimistic scenario, represented an agent that would not seek out engagement with a provider, compared to the optimistic scenario representing an agent that would. In Figure 9a&b this is shown to affect the rate of confidence building.
Whilst this succeeds in demonstrating the extremes of the dynamic model, we are not suggesting the 'aggressor' personality set is the ideal for all recipient transactions.
In the dynamic model the rate at which the regulator's confidence increased with time influenced confidence building. Experts told us that the rate of confidence building also varied for the three case studies. In the radioactive waste case, confidence would build at a slower rate because of the greater level of uncertainty characterising the decision. In our model this was mostly reflected by the influence of an agent's motivation to process and share knowledge between the pessimistic and the optimistic scenarios.
Having demonstrated a 'proof of concept' two-agent model, we believe it possible to develop a fully-fledged multi-agent system for the full set of interactions in Figure 1 , say.
This would allow us to fully map the decision processes that have been validated by the experts and create 'behavioural signatures' to distinguish between agents in different positions within each decision hierarchy (see Mischel, 1999; Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Shoda, 1999; Shoda et al., 2002) . Moreover, we have not fully explored the use of dependency in TESLA™. By applying the concept of dependency during the exchange of evidence, we might allow agents to evaluate new evidence only, making the transaction more realistic.
Conclusions
This paper demonstrates it is possible to construct a two-agent model to reflect authentic regulatory situations, personality influences and power structures on information flows. Existing risk frameworks pay little homage to the reality that decisions are made by people, and as such, frameworks can fail to account for the influence power and personality may have on the brokering of evidence that supports decisions about risk (Powell, 1999) .
Here, an exploratory research tool capable of mapping the logic of how evidence is brokered, and confidence built, was developed. Simulation of personalities sets generating the greatest and least agent receptivity (and thereby for building confidence) in this model were found to be the 'aggressor' and 'avoider' personality. Comparing the most optimistic and pessimistic Equations (1) and (2) were used to calculate agent receptivity. The values assigned to the personality traits (i.e. openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, emotional stability) depended in the personality assigned to the agent.
(1) R.Receptivity = (R.PtT + R.MtP + P.Tw + P.RP)/3
(2) P.Receptivity = (R.Tw + R.RP + P.PtT + P.MtP + R.Mts)/4
Where: Table 2 (a,b) Levels of intensity characterising (a) decision uncertainty; and (b) personality trait, where "Random" refers to the option to select values using a random number generator. Table 3 . Showing relative levels of intensity (low, medium and high) assigned to each personality, where "Random" refers to the option to select a value at random between 0 and 1 using the MS Excel® random number generator. 
